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 1 
Introduction 
 
India’s growing economy, new Indian government approaches to foreign policy and in 
particular its new relationship with the United States have created a new context for and 
a new focus on India’s perspective on geo-politics and security matters, both 
domestically and internationally.   There has been a developing literature over recent 
years on the tensions within Indian foreign policy between what is sometimes 
characterised as a Ghandian or Nehruvian approach, seen in non alignment and a 
commitment to United Nations peacekeeping and an alternative vision more grounded in 
realpolitik and state interests.1  There has been however a quite limited analysis of the 
implications of these tensions for India’s perspectives on peace-building and conflict 
resolution either within South Asia or at a more global level.  This is not simply of 
interest to scholars of South Asia.  As India’s global role increases it will be increasingly 
necessary to situate India’s perspective on security matters, both domestic and 
international, within a wider context 
 
India has not, to date, produced a single security strategy document which can be directly 
compared to others such as the US national security strategies or the 2003 EU security 
strategy2.  There are reports that such a document is in the drafting stage, but it was not 
available at the time of writing.3  This chapter uses the EU and US documents as a 
backdrop – representing in rhetorical terms different approaches to international 
security, as discussed further below, and analyses the approach taken by India within this 
context.      
 
The starting point of this chapter is informed by the author’s involvement in two 
separate EU funded projects4 dealing with comparative studies of peace processes, 
                                                 
1 For example, Subrata K Mitra and Jivanta Schottli , ‘The new dynamics of Indian foreign policy and its 
ambiguities’, Irish Studies in International Affairs vol. 18, 2007, pp. 19-34. 
2 A Secure Europe in a Better World, the European Union Security Strategy agreed by the European Council 
on 12 December  2003 and the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (11 September 
2002).  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf  and  http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/ , both accessed on 26 September 2011. 
3 See Indian Ministry of Defence website http://mod.nic.in/aboutus/welcome.html , accessed on 26 
September 2011.  
4 The first  project was led by Prof Radha Kumar of the Delhi Policy Group.  The second was led by the 
Nelson Mandela Centre for Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, first of all by Prof 
Kumar and later by Prof. Tasneem Meenai.  The author wishes to acknowledge support of the Asia Link 
fund of the Europe Aid cooperation Office and the earlier EU-India Economic Cross Cultural programme 
for financial support received for these two projects.   
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conflict resolution and wider peace building – one focused exclusively on EU - India 
comparisons and the other on the wider South Asia region.  Those two projects 
collectively involved a range of innovative interactions between European and Indian 
universities and included six high profile closed door seminars with policy-makers, 
military and security actors, diplomats and academics; 35 student-simulation exercises in 
seven Indian cities where international experts facilitated 2-day sessions, each with about 
40 postgraduate students; faculty exchanges; six academic workshops (of 3 to 4 days 
each) which focused on how each region can best be ‘taught’ to students in the other and 
the production of a range of curricular materials from leading experts in each region to 
assist the development of teaching of the EU within India and vice versa.5   
 
This chapter seeks to situate Indian state perspectives on security and conflict resolution 
within the extensive international debate on the US and EU security strategies.  It is 
commonly asserted, and was often repeated during the seminars referred to above, that 
Indian security policy – especially that related to internal conflicts and conflicts with 
neighbours – reflects a much more traditional view of security than is often assumed by 
those whose focus is on Indian foreign policy at the United Nations or India’s high level 
of participation in UN peacekeeping operations.6  This ‘traditional’ view of security 
emphasises both a high degree of traditional external threat (compared to Europe for 
example) and also a high degree of fear of internal secession by states ‘on the margins’ of 
the Indian Union.  The debates on Indian security generally focus on a few key factors in 
explaining Indian state perspectives on security and its supposed different character from 
Europe.  Firstly it is asserted that as Indian independence is still a relatively recent event, 
compared to other large states with which it is compared, that Indian policy makers 
‘naturally’ hold a more Westphalian vision of state sovereignty.7  The recent nature of 
state sovereignty and the particular circumstances of the partition settlement and its 
aftermath, also, it is commonly argued make Indian policy-makers hyper-conscious about 
the dangers of state-disintegration and the possible domino-effect of the loss of state 
territory or state control, even in very small and marginal (to New Delhi) areas such as 
Nagaland.  The focus on a strong version of Westphalian state sovereignty is said to be 
                                                 
5 The outputs of the first of those projects, coordinated by the Delhi Policy Group can be seen at 
http://www.partitionconflicts.com/partitions/peaceprocesses/overview/ , accessed on 26 September 
2011.   
6 For a good review see Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi , ‘Explaining Sixty Years of India's Foreign 
Policy’, India Review, vol. 8, no. 1, 2009, pp. 4-19. 
7
 David P. Fidler and Sumit Ganguly “India and Eastphalia”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 17, 
no. 1, 2010, pp. 147-164. 
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re-enforced by the relative weakness of regional cooperation and the regional 
organisation SAARC.   
 
Historic events since independence have strengthened rather than diminished these early 
tendencies in state security policy.  The 1962 border war with China, not only ended the 
potential for a common ‘non-aligned’ intervention in global affairs and ended all practical 
talk of Chini-Hindi Bai-Bai, but it also set up a security complex in South Asia between 
India, China and Pakistan that ultimately went nuclear and added a further level of 
complexity to the conflict in Kashmir.  Most Indian discourse on ‘internal’ conflicts has 
utilised a strong ‘external’ dimension – the conflict in Kashmir and before it Punjab is 
analysed through a lens of Pakistani interference and agitation and the conflicts in the 
north east have been linked to ‘training camps’ in Bangladesh and Myanmar.  This 
discourse has been challenged somewhat in the contemporary period as the ability to 
explicitly link the ‘Naxalite’ uprisings to external actors is much weaker and relations with 
Bangladesh have improved.   
 
Indian discourse also, at least partly, explains internal conflicts through the lens of 
modernisation theory, as a product of low levels of development (and by implication low 
levels of education) which will only be resolved over time though economic growth and 
investment.8  Critical voices within India also focus their analysis in this area however 
such groups and individuals focus on state actions which increase inequality, land and 
food scarcity, whereas state discourses focus on the historic legacy of underdevelopment 
which the state claims to be rectifying.9   
 
In summary, the starting point (rather than the conclusion) for many analyses of  
contemporary Indian security policy it is that is more focused on external threats by 
other states and on threats to India’s territorial integrity than other major states and that 
therefore India’s approach to security challenges and conflict resolution tends to focus 
on military dimensions and territorial control with very limited official focus on what 
might be broadly characterised as human security.    However such summaries of Indian 
policy, often assume an international perspective and especially a European view on 
                                                 
8 See a good case of the implications of such thinking in Ravina Aggarwal and Mona Bhan, ‘Disarming 
Violence: Development, Democracy, and Security on the Borders of India’, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 
68, 2009, pp. 519-542. 
9 Arundhati  Roy, Field Notes on Democracy: Listening to Grasshoppers, New Delhi:  Penguin Books, 2009. 
 4 
security matters which is more focused on human security concerns and more open to 
post Westphalian perspectives than is justified by an analysis of European actions – 
whatever the rhetoric of the EU security policy.  
 
Contextualising Indian state perspectives on security and terrorism 
 
While many international comparisons for India’s security strategy might be chosen, this 
chapter utilises the 2002 and 2003 documents issued by the US and the EU.  The 
documents and their relationship to the post 9-11 US led war on terror and the 
transatlantic divisions on Iraq sparked a large and significant academic debate not only 
on the depth of the dispute between the US and some of its former European allies but 
also on the nature of the US and European security policies.  This literature on 
transatlantic tensions includes a range of frames of reference. Cox and Poulit debate 
presumed differences of ideology and emphasis; Boniface argues that the EU perspective 
on international order prioritises multilateralism in contrast to the US unilateralism; Den 
Boer and Monar on the other hand see a largely positive relationship on the issue of 
terrorism in the period immediately after the 9-11 attacks, while Doyle and Connolly 
discuss the limitations to US unilateral use of power, even with their military dominance 
over Europe.10  The range of material and the diversity of interpretations makes a further 
comparison with India challenging but this is made somewhat clearer when the analysis is 
focused on the strategy papers of 2002 and 2003, rather than wider international 
discourse.  Alyson Bailes for example compares the policy focused US strategy with the 
EU’s ‘inspirational sketch’ designed to draw EU members back together after the 
divisions over Iraq and to ‘show the world that they mean business’.11  Simon Duke 
acknowledges the limitations of a comparison of the documents but argues that a 
                                                 
10 Michael Cox, ‘Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, 
no. 2, 2005, pp. 203-233.  Vincent Pouliot, ‘The Alive and Well Transatlantic Security Community: A 
Theoretical Reply to Michael Cox’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 12, no. 1, 2006, pp. 119-
127.  Michael Cox, ‘Let's Argue about the West: Reply to Vincent Pouliot, European Journal of International 
Relations, vol. 12, no. 1, 2006, pp. 129-134.    William Drozdiak, ‘The North Atlantic Drift.’  Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 84, no. 1, 2005, pp. 88-98; John Peterson, America as a European power: the end of empire by 
integration? International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 4, 2004, pp. 613-629. Pascal Boniface, ‘Reflections on America 
as a World Power: A European View’, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 29, no. 3, 2000, pp. 5-15. Minica den 
Boer and Jorg Monar, (2002) ‘11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security 
Actor’. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 3, 2002, pp.11 - 28.  John Doyle and Eileen Connolly, 
‘US power after Sept 11th- increasing international insecurity’, Development Review, 2002, pp. 31-50.  
11 Alyson Bailes, ‘EU and US Strategic Concepts: A Mirror for Partnership and Difference?’ The 
International Spectator, vol. 39, no. 1, 2004, pp. 19-33. 
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significant justification for a comparative approach is that events since then have focused 
more attention on basic questions of strategy, mission and purpose.12   
 
The United States issued its National Security Strategy (NSS) in September 2002 just 
after the anniversary of the 9-11 attacks and in a clear context framed by those attacks, 
the overthrow of the Taliban and the increasing talk of an invasion of Iraq.  This 
document, the first of two issued by the Bush administration, drew heavily, however, on 
the policy positions articulated during the 2000 election and was not simply a response to 
the 9-11 attacks.13  A Secure Europe in a Better World, the European Union Security Strategy 
(EUSS) agreed by the European Council on 12 December 2003 is in many ways a self 
conscious attempt to respond to the US National Security Strategy of 2002.  The EU 
strategy was clearly written with the perspective of the Bush administration in mind and 
conceptualising it in that context allows the differences in the two documents to be 
clarified.  It also then allows contemporary Indian strategy to be situated between these 
two much debated papers – often construed as alternative visions for contemporary 
security policy from otherwise close democratic allies. 
 
US National Security Strategy 2002 
The 2002 US National Security Strategy begins by setting out a vision based on a clear 
duality in international politics 
 
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism 
ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable 
model for national success.14 
 
There is a studied refusal to address the causes of terrorism in the NSS, terrorism is 
simply seen to exist and must be defeated, but its causes are not analysed.   While the 
document acknowledges that a ‘world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half 
of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable,’ it then goes on to 
assert that ‘Decades of massive development assistance have failed to spur economic 
growth in the poorest countries. Worse, development aid has often served to prop up 
                                                 
12 Simon Duke, The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does it Make for Secure 
Alliances in a Better World? European Foreign Affairs Review vol. 9, 2004, pp.  459–481. 
13 See for example, Condoleezza Rice ‘Promoting the National Interest’, Foreign Affairs, vol., no. 1, 2000, p. 
45 – 62, for a good example of the election campaign foreign policy. 
14 National Security Strategy, p.1, introduction. 
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failed policies, relieving the pressure for reform and perpetuating misery.’15  There is no 
sense that poverty or injustice need to be specifically addressed to deal with security 
threats.  It is also noteworthy that there is no focus in the document on internal security 
threats in the United States - the focus is exclusively on securing borders and external 
threats. 
 
The NSS talks about a multidimensional approaches to counter-terrorism – ‘To defeat 
this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal’ but then the following list of 
‘tools’ are very narrowly based - ‘military power, better homeland defenses, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.16  They do 
not even include public diplomacy in this high level summary list, much less action 
through the UN or even bilateral action on issues such as underdevelopment or injustice.  
Later the document does seem to offer a role for at least a one sided public diplomacy 
when it says that the US ‘will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against 
international terrorism. This includes: using the full influence of the United States, and 
working closely with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are 
illegitimate.’  There is little sense however of dialogue or according any value to negative 
perceptions about US foreign policy, or any acknowledgement that there is no 
international consensus on who should be labelled a ‘terrorist’.  The document simply 
assumes that the US perspective is unproblematic and uncontested and the role of 
strategy is simply one of using power to achieve objectives.   The only hint at dealing 
with clashes of perception is a vague reference that ‘In many regions, legitimate 
grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and 
must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror’.17  In the 
discussion on counter-terrorism, military resources are continually prioritised in the 
document.  Diplomacy only plays a supporting role.  In a typical phrasing from the NSS 
it says,  ‘As the United States Government relies on the armed forces to defend 
America’s interests, it must rely on diplomacy to interact with other nations’ – diplomacy 
is not explicitly seen as ‘defending American interests’ – that is the role of military 
power.18 
 
                                                 
15 National Security Strategy, p.21. 
16 National Security Strategy, p.3, introduction. 
17 National Security Strategy, p.5, introduction. 
18 National Security Strategy, p.30 
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Though the NSS clearly states that international terrorism is the greatest security threat 
to the USA, this threat , particularly form non state actors is situated strongly within a 
wider state focused geopolitics, which focuses no only on the so called ‘axis of evil’ but 
also on large rivals and potential rivals.  There is therefore considerable emphasis on 
maintaining US military superiority over all other states in the world or any likely 
combination of them.  This focus on military resources intensified in the following years 
with major increases in military expenditures compared to other states and a further 
strengthening of the US military’s dominance over all counter terrorism strategy.  US 
military expenditure grew by over 7% annually from 2000 to 2010 and by the end of the 
decade represented over 42% of global military expenditure and by far the largest 
percentage of GNP devoted to the military by a large state.19 
 
International organisations and international law play a very marginal role in the security 
strategy.  International law is only invoked in the context of terrorist finances and 
international criminal investigations.20  The United Nations is totally marginal, referred to 
only in lists of other organisations and not given any serious role either as a source of 
legitimacy or an institutional actor.  For example it says in the introduction that the 
‘United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World 
Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO.21    Later the UN 
is placed on a par with NGOs - ‘we will continue to work with international 
organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations’.22 
 
Failed or weak states are seen as a particular security threat.  ‘Poverty does not make 
poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption 
can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their 
borders’.23  Yet the focus again is on a policing and intelligence response rather than 
support for state-building. – for example ‘Together with our European allies, we must 
help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous 
borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny 
                                                 
19 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 
2010.   http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010 , accessed on 26 September 2011. 
20 For example, National Security Strategy,  p.6. 
21  National Security Strategy , p5, introduction. 
22  National Security Strategy, p.7. 
23 National Security Strategy, p.4, introduction. 
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havens for terrorists.’24  When dealing with non state threats in weak states the strategy 
states that the USA ‘will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, 
and financial tools necessary to finish the task.’25 
 
The US security strategy of 2002 is of course just one of many such documents issued by 
the US administration over the years and other later editions were issued by the Bush and 
Obama administrations.  There are both significant differences and continuities across all 
recent strategy documents.  However the focus of this paper is to situate the Indian 
security approach rather than analyse US policy per se.  The 2002 NSS has been chosen 
for this purpose as it is a conceptually useful pole, often seen as a particularly hard-line 
and militarily focused take on a US security perspective – though most of its key tenets 
are repeated in the later security strategies.  The 2002 NSS in this context offers a 
conceptually clear and well known international example with which to compare recent 
Indian government perspectives.   
 
 
A Secure Europe in a Better World, the European Union Security Strategy 
The EU Security Strategy, written just over one year after the US document and after the 
European splits on the issue of the invasion of Iraq, is in many respects an attempt by 
the EU to create some credibility on foreign and security policy but also to offer an 
alternative security strategy to that articulated by the administration of US President 
George W. Bush.  The EU represents just one element of the ‘European’ response to 
conflict and terrorism.  Member states, for example, retain exclusive responsibility for 
internal conflict.  While there was significant external involvement in the Northern 
Ireland peace process, the most significant external actors were American, with South 
Africa and Canada involved at times.26  The EU provided some limited funding but its 
direct role in the conflict resolution process was negligible. Likewise Spain has rejected 
any international or EU involvement in the conflict in the Basque Country, to the extent 
of even refusing to consider allowing international observers to oversee ETA’s 
destruction of its armaments.  On international security and conflict resolution while 
                                                 
24 National Security Strategy, pp.10-11. 
25 National Security Strategy, p.6. 
26 For brief overview see John Doyle “‘Towards a Lasting Peace’? : the Northern Ireland multi-party 
agreement, referendum and Assembly elections of 1998”, Scottish Affairs, 25: 1-20, 1998.  Scottish Affairs, 
25: 1-20, 1998 and John Doyle “Re-examining the Northern Ireland conflict”  pp 132-146., in Vassilis K. 
Fouskas ed., The Politics of Conflict: A Survey.  London: Routledge, 2007.    
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much activity on diplomacy, post-conflict supports and peace-building is coordinated 
through the EU, most EU member states are also members of NATO and use it as their 
primary vehicle for military cooperation and even within NATO they have divided 
politically in their attitudes to recent NATO interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.    
 
The EU strategy therefore is much more of an ideal type, representing what is sometimes 
summarised as a human security approach – which sits within a wider European security 
strategy composed of the member state’s security doctrines, and NATO.  In the actions 
and security doctrines of member states, and within NATO, there are obviously much 
stronger representations of a traditional state-centred and military-focused security 
strategy all of which combine to create the overall ‘European’ security strategy. However, 
notwithstanding the fact that the EU security strategy does not encapsulate all of 
‘Europe’s’ security strategy it is still a useful document – agreed to by all the then EU 
member states and representing to some degree at least a collective view in the aftermath 
of divisions on the invasion of Iraq.  The EUSS is therefore, in this context, a useful 
conceptual reflection of a particular sort of security policy – a conscious contrast to that 
of President Bush. 
 
The differences in the discourse used in the two documents are clear from the beginning 
when the ‘complex causes’ of terrorism are acknowledged and the EU also acknowledges 
(before the Madrid and London attacks) that such causes are internal to Europe as well 
as external - ‘the most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to 
violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures 
of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people 
living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society’.27  The 
complexity of terrorism is also seen in the way the document deals with weak states as 
the causal direction is almost reversed.  Whereas the US document sees failed states as a 
threat with no discussion on why they fail, the EU document see conflict leading to state 
failure – not the other way around, ‘Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak 
institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within…. 
Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or 
terrorism.28 
 
                                                 
27  A Secure Europe in a Better World,  p. 4. 
28 A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 5. 
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The EU strategy is much stronger on the multi-layered approached needed to combat 
terrorism.   ‘In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new 
threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a 
mixture of instruments’.29  The EU explicitly links other aspects of international action to 
conflict resolution and counter-terrorism - aid, trade etc, asserting that  
 Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting 
human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order. … 
Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As 
the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the 
European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals. … 
A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure 
for the European Union and its citizens.30 
 
The EU security strategy is clear that it sees no credible traditional territorial threat to the 
Union or its member states.  It calls for improved EU military capacities, but for 
deployment exclusively outside the territory of the EU (a provision later legally enshrined 
in the EU Treaty of Lisbon).  EU member states collectively, spend significantly less than 
the USA, about €275 billion, compared to the US €700 billion, but the real gap in 
capacity is even greater.31  Firstly there is limited collective political will by EU member 
states (or even those who are NATO members) to deploy military power, either in major 
operations such as Afghanistan or minor EU led operations.  The EU’s ‘battle groups’ of 
1500 troops for rapid deployment have been on standby since 2007 and have never been 
used, despite strong pressure to send then to the DRC in 2008, for an operation which 
would not have been politically controversial.32  Secondly the lack of coordination of 
military expenditure and the slow base of military reform is typified by the EU 
continuing to possess nearly 10,000 main battle tanks as a legacy of defence planning 
against the USSR, while struggling to provide air support  for its operation in Chad.  The 
EU strategy is clear that responses to security threats need to be multi-dimensional and it 
                                                 
29 A Secure Europe in a Better World, p. 8. 
30 A Secure Europe in a Better World p. 11. 
31 EU Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief, December 2009.  
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/PolicyBrief-05.pdf , accessed on 26 September 2011. 
32 Rory Keane, EU Battle group Must Be Deployed to Conflict in Congo.  The Irish Times, 1 November 
2008, p.10. 
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distinguishes itself strongly from the USA in this regard.  However it remains a challenge 
for the EU to put this into practice. 
 
The EU’s strength is asserted to be one based on its own experience of multilateralism 
internally, while recognising that it needs to strengthen its coherence in expressing itself 
externally 
 The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: 
European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military 
and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these 
can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the 
first condition for development …Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and 
environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no 
substitute for unity of command. Better co-ordination between external action 
and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism 
and organised crime. … Greater coherence is needed not only among EU 
instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member 
state.33 
 
The EU document also accords the United Nations and international law a central place 
– ‘Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system.  
We are committed to upholding and developing International Law.  …  The United 
Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security’.34 
 
Though the language is generalised a number of themes are clear, which differ 
considerably in focus from the US document.  Terrorism is seen to have has complex 
causes, including poverty, injustice, state collapse (not state ‘failure’) and human rights 
abuses and not just religious extremism.  It acknowledges that the sources of conflict and 
terrorism exists within European society, it is not simply an ‘external’ threat originating in 
other countries and is very clear that responses must be multi-dimensional and include 
development, trade, diplomacy and criminal justice as well as military capacity, which it 
acknowledges the EU needs to develop.  It argues that the EU is well placed to offer 
multidimensional responses within its own institutions and by coordinating member state 
                                                 
33 A Secure Europe in a Better World  p. 14. 
34 A Secure Europe in a Better World  p. 10. 
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responses while also affirming that international law and the role of the United Nations is 
crucial 
 
The differences in the EU and US documents are summarised in the following table,  
 
Table 1, Comparison of EUSS and NSS, on key concepts 
Aspect of the debate EU SS US NSS 
Explicitly Defining causes Complex, and recognise EU is 
source as well as target of 
terrorists 
Not analysed, threats are external 
and focus is border security. 
Link to poverty and injustice Listed as specific causes Linked to instability but rejected 
as ‘justification’ 
Responses multi-dimensional responses are 
EU strength 
development, trade diplomacy, 
military, criminal justice.  Trade 
and development policy 
highlighted. 
Military superiority is US strength 
focused on intelligence, threat 
assessment and the military and 
using diplomacy only to build 
alliances 
Role of international law Crucial in building norms and 
legitimacy 
Only mentioned in arrest 
warrants, financing etc 
Role of UN primary responsibility, EU 
priority 
Mentioned in same context as 
NGOs and OAS 
 
It is in making this comparison that the EU Security Strategy becomes a more 
meaningful document.  It is stripped of some of its generalities and its purpose in setting 
out an image of a different analysis of threats and a different analysis of appropriate 
responses is clear.  However this is after all a document in many ways designed to assert 
a view of the EU rather than as a guide to action.  Lacking credible military resources and 
internally divided among its member states on some crucial issues the EUSS was not a 
policy framework in quite the same way as the US NSS.  Nonetheless it does offer a 
different strategic vision and it is between these two competing strategic visions that the 
following section analyses the contemporary Indian position on security, terrorism and 
conflict. 
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Indian security strategy  
 
The following analysis of Indian state perspectives, in the absence of a single equivalent 
document draws on recent government level statements on security, terrorism and 
conflict resolution from the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and 
Minister of Home Affairs.  The analysis is framed around the key issues set out in table 
one, with the addition of an explicit discussion  on regionalism as part of the 
international response, which is not so relevant for the USA, but is central to the EU 
approach and which has been raised as a key issue for India. 
     
Causes 
Indian has traditionally sought to portray its most serious internal and regional conflicts 
as being caused primarily by external action by neighbouring states.  The conflicts in 
Punjab and the North East and above all in Kashmir were almost exclusively described 
as being stoked and intensified by Pakistan, whom India regularly accuses, not only of 
giving diplomatic support to insurgent groups within India, but also of smuggling 
fighters across the Line of Control and of organised direct assaults such as the 2008 
attacks in Mumbai.35     
 
While India’s poor relations with Pakistan are universally acknowledged, the importance 
of China for Indian security strategy is often minimised in western analysis.   Indian 
nuclear posture and maritime security in particular, are always framed in terms of the 
relationship with China rather than Pakistan.36  For ‘internal’ conflicts however Pakistan 
remains the state most often seen as offering a serious threat to Indian security.37  There 
have some interesting developments in very recent times.  The criticisms of Pakistan and 
the fear of China remain of course but the Naxalite insurgency is increasingly described 
as the most serious internal conflict by senior Indian politicians and the discourse of 
Indian officials has been much less likely to seek to link it to other states than the 
Kashmir conflict. This shift of focus to a greater acceptance of the internal dynamics of 
conflict is now strongly reflected in government statements.  Two recent high profile 
                                                 
35 Statement by Home Minister Shri P. Chidambaram, 27 May 2011.  http://pib.nic.in, accessed on 26 
September 2011.  
36 See for example statement by Defence Minister Shri AK Antony, 5 May 2010, and 27 November 2009, 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx, accessed on 26 September 2011.  
37 For example statement by Defence Minister Shri AK Antony, is headed ‘Pakistan an Epicenter of 
International Terrorism’, 3 February 2009. 
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contributions by the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh use an identical phrase 
in describing security threats – ‘left-wing extremism, cross border terrorism and religious 
fundamentalism’, explicitly acknowledging the internal dimensions of conflict, which was 
often absent in earlier periods.38  Even more strikingly India's Home Minister 
Chidambaram said, in a statement to the BBC in the immediate aftermath of the 
September 2011 attack on the Delhi High Court that the assault was carried out by 
militants based in India and went to say that ‘we can no longer point to cross-border 
terrorism as a source of terror attacks in India’.39   Contemporary security policy 
therefore seems to point to a more nuanced understanding of causes and a greater 
balance between internal and external causes. 
 
Linkages with poverty and injustice 
Indian discourse on causes of conflict is certainly much more focused on analysing 
underlying causes than the US National Security Strategy and public statements 
frequently deal with issues such as poverty and political grievances.  However India 
government strategy is often unclear as to whether there is an acceptance that conflict is 
sparked and escalated by underlying issues such as inequality and injustice or whether the 
state simply sees conflict as arising out of conditions of poverty and lack of education, in 
a sense as an extension of classic modernisation theory, rather than a grievance focused 
theory of conflict. 
 
When speaking of the end of the Sri Lanka war Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
welcomed the ‘decimation’ of the LTTE, but also said that the ‘problem does not 
disappear with the defeat of the LTTE.  The Tamil population has legitimate grievances 
... have been reduced over the years to second class citizens’.40  However when discussing 
conflicts within India, the use of public expenditure has been seen as a hearts and minds 
strategy or an attempt to lift people out of ignorance, rather than a recognition of prior 
wrongs.  When speaking about the Naxalite insurgency Prime Minister Singh says 
 One emphasis is on intelligence so that they [the police] match them in actual 
combat. The other is on development. Development is the master remedy to win 
                                                 
38 PM's address at the second Annual Conference of Chief Secretaries,   4 February  2011 and PM's address 
at the CMs' Conference on Internal Security,   1 February 2011.  both on PMs website 
http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm, accessed on 22 September 2011.   
39 BBC news website,  9 September 2011. 
40 Interaction between PM and Newspaper editors 29 June 2011. http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm, 
accessed on 22 September 2011.  
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over people. If my children are in school, better health facilities are available, if 
forest rights of tribals are respected, ---- implemented, it should win over people. 
In the short run, government’s writ must run.41 
 
While the comments on forest rights might be taken as accepting that such rights are not 
currently respected the commitment to ‘development’ includes no such acceptance.  The 
need for dialogue is accepted but there is a limited acknowledgement of the legitimacy of 
protest groups.  The PM, referring to Kashmir said somewhat condescendingly that ‘The 
dialogue can embrace all the issues that agitate the minds of the people of Jammu & 
Kashmir, especially the youth. The dialogue can address issues such as the trust deficit 
and the governance deficit’.42   
 
This duality of recognition and denial is also seen in the recent peace talks in Assam in 
the Indian North East, with the ULFA group (United Liberation Front of Assam).    The 
Home Minister Shri P. Chidambaram stated that ‘the steps taken by the ULFA leaders 
for restoration of peace and normalcy in the area would yield speedier socio-economic 
development of the people of Assam. He stated that the concerns expressed by ULFA 
leaders are of concern to the State and Union Government. He assured the delegation 
that there is no problem which cannot be resolved with in the framework of the 
Constitution of the India.’43  Yet after the ceasefire a statement announcing it used the 
phrase, ‘ULFA had earlier agreed to abjure violence and find a solution to the problems as 
perceived by them (author’s emphasis)’, which tends to minimise the degree of Indian 
government acceptance of underlying problems. 
  
On many occasions the Indian government hints at more substantial recognition of 
grievances, such as in the first ULFA related statement above. Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh said earlier this year that ‘I have repeatedly stated that the Indian 
Constitution is a remarkably flexible instrument, capable of accommodating a diverse 
range of aspirations’.44  Yet the overall emphasis is to treat protestors claims as 
misunderstandings or the anger of unemployed and uneducated people.  A more 
substantial acceptance of the need to take claims of inequality and injustice seriously on 
                                                 
41  Interaction between PM and Newspaper editors 29 June 2011. http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm, 
accessed on 22 September 2011.  
42 PM comments 13 September 2010.  http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm, accessed on 22 September 2011. 
43   Statement on 5 August 2011.  http://pib.nic.in , accessed on 26 September 2011.  
44 PM comments 1 February 2011.  http://pmindia.nic.in/pressrel.htm, accessed on 22 September 2011. 
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their own terms as underlying causes of conflict is much less evident in situations of 
internal conflict than when commenting on the region.  This is at one level to be 
expected.  No government likes to accept responsibility for grievances over which it has 
control.  The EU security strategy focus on underlying causes is after all speaking of 
conflicts outside the EU.  The British and Spanish governments, during the conflicts in 
Northern Ireland and the Basque region, did not accept responsibility for underlying 
causes or for human rights abuses which escalated the conflict.  This changed to some 
degree ultimately in Northern Ireland, where from the late 1980s there was a more 
serious attempt to deal with inequality, even if primarily driven by a ‘hearts and minds’ 
strategy to reduce support for the IRA within disadvantaged nationalist communities. 
 
There is a more substantial engagement with linkages between conflict / terrorism and 
underlying grievances by the India government that that suggested by the US National 
Security Strategy.  At times the language even goes further than the European Union, in 
so far as it is also accepting some responsibility itself, for conflicts within its own 
territory.  However there is an inconsistency in the Indian position, an oscillation 
between what at times seems like a long term commitment to deal with underlying issues 
of inequality, land tenure, corruption and injustice and a tendency to see insurgents as 
uneducated, a problem which will simply be dealt with by a more generalised process of 
modernisation and economic development.  This ambiguity causes real problems for 
India as even large scale economic investment in ‘disturbed’ areas often makes no real 
contribution to conflict resolution, or makes local corruption worse, as it occurs in a 
political vacuum where other  issues and underlying power relationships are not being 
addressed 
 
The Role of international law and the United Nations 
India has a longstanding record of support for and high level of engagement in the 
United Nations.  When focused on international conflicts, this is the area where the 
Indian position is at greatest distance from the USA.  Two recent high level statements 
reiterate the long-standing commitment to the organisation.  The Joint India-EU 
declaration on terrorism in 2010 states that both parties ‘Attach great importance to 
counter terrorism cooperation in the framework of United Nations and share a 
commitment to universal ratification and full implementation of all UN Counter 
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Terrorism conventions’.45  The 2011 Sanya declaration, signed by the Heads of State and 
Government of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa also asserted that ‘the 
United Nations has a central role in coordinating the international action against 
terrorism within the framework of the UN Charter and in accordance with principles and 
norms of the international law’.46 
 
India’s commitment to UN peacekeeping, far exceeds that of European Union states in 
its commitment to UN-led peace keeping, where EU member states, with few exceptions 
have played a relatively small role in recent years.  India had 8400 police and soldiers on 
UN led missions in July 2011.  (Pakistan interestingly has slightly more with 10626 and 
Bangladesh had the highest number of any country at 10654).47  These South Asian states 
make up the top three contributors.  No EU member state reached a figure of 2000 
police and troops and all the battalion sized EU member state contributions were on the 
UNIFIL mission in Lebanon – a very specific UN deployment.48   
 
India’s opposition to the International Criminal Court, however, places it with the US 
position on this question and at odds with Europe, where despite intense US pressure all 
EU member states endorsed the founding Treaty.  Bendiek and Wagner argues that 
India’s attitude to multilateralism is different form the EU’s (and by implication closer to 
the USA).  They argue that India seek to pursue ‘a more traditional great power approach 
in contrast to the EU’ and in support of this they cite the ICC decision, India’s refusal to 
join the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and India’s long standing position of 
opposition to international involvement in any mediation attempts over Kashmir, despite 
an early acceptance of a UN supervised plebiscite.49  Without denying India’s ambitions 
to be recognised as a global and regional power, this is to misunderstand the strategic 
advantages India’s perceives from a more multilateral world order, which gives it greater 
freedom of manoeuvre between other powers.  India has opposed the development of 
the doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’ seeing it as giving licence to the US and others 
to intervene in what it considers the internal affairs of states.  This was India’s position at 
                                                 
45 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/118405.pdf, accessed 
on 15 September 2011.  
46 China Daily 14 April 2011. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/brics2011/2011-
04/14/content_12329531.htm, accessed on 15 August 2011. 
47 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/aug11_1.pdf, accessed on 22 September 2011.  
48 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/aug11_3.pdf  
49 Annegret Bendiek and Christian Wagner, ‘Prospects and Challenges of EU India Security Cooperation’, 
in Shazia Aziz Wülbers (ed), EU India relations: a critique, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2008, pp. 153-
168. 
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the start of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya in 2011.50  Fear of external 
intervention on Kashmir and its perception of a threat from China certainly puts India 
firmly with the USA on the priority accorded to state interests and territorial security, 
however if the comparison is with ‘Europe’, including NATO and EU member states 
national security doctrines, rather than the EU per se the differences are not strong.  If 
the question is one of support for the UN and opposition to unilateral military action by 
the USA and its allies then the Indian position on multilateralism is much closer to EU 
norms that US.  Fundamentally Indian governments have seen their state interests as 
better secured in a world where US unilateral power is constrained by a mix of traditional 
multilateralism and in recent years a more assertive global position by emerging powers 
such as India, which  can lead to cooperation with the USA on issues such as its nuclear 
deal, as well as balancing against the US on other occassions. 
 
The question of the ICC is better explored within India’s position on the role of 
international law and in particular human rights law, which has on occasion been a 
source of some tension between the EU and India, with some Indian officials and 
politicians, at least in private, objecting to what they see as preaching from EU leaders. 
Without diminishing the very serious questions raised by Indian civil society and a very 
critical statement on Indian government treatment of human rights activists by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret 
Sekaggya,51 the Indian government public position is no different to European states 
with internal conflicts.  The EU position on the central role played by human rights 
violations in conflict escalation can only be realistically understood as referring to 
contexts outside of the EU.  Certainly the Indian government has some serious issues to 
address and it needs to acknowledge to a much greater degree the role of human rights 
violations by security forces in deepening conflict.  However in its public security 
strategy, its position is at least comparable to EU norms.  
 
Regionalism  
Though not addressed in the US security strategy, the EU document rests implicitly on a 
certain understanding of regional integration playing a key role in building peace in 
Europe.  The EU itself promotes this vision strongly for other regions in its external 
                                                 
50 For example, The Times of India, 18 March 2011. 
51 http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10660&LangID=E, 
accessed on 26 September 2011  
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relations.52  A recent article by the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle is typical 
of the type of argument made by many senior European figures over the past 20 or 30 
years: ‘The European Union is the most successful peace project in the history of our 
continent’.53  Despite a healthy scepticism about the external foreign policy capacity of 
the EU, its role in creating inter-state peace is often left uncontested in comparative 
discussions about SAARC.54  Even while the EU’s external reach is dismissed, it is 
assumed to have played a central role in the sustaining of inter-state peace within its own 
borders.    
 
The EU experience in the two major conflicts on its own territory, Northern Ireland and 
the Basque Country, suggests that we should not set too high an ambition for SAARC in 
regional conflicts such as that in Kashmir.  Certainly a better bilateral relationship 
between India and Pakistan will be essential if either SAARC is to develop or if the 
Kashmir dispute is to be resolved.   The fringes of SAARC meetings may provide a 
useful informal meeting point for India and Pakistan. This was useful between Ireland 
and Britain for the Northern Ireland conflict.  The EU experience suggests that SAARC 
is unlikely to play a significant role as an institution, but also that the strong focus on 
state sovereignty from India and Pakistan is not necessarily a barrier to progress. The UK 
was equally strong on the issue of state sovereignty and non-interference up until the 
1990s, when some international (but not EU) interventions were accepted in the 
Northern Ireland case.  Neither was the UK’s traditional view on sovereignty an 
insurmountable barrier to innovative institutional solutions and the use of international 
commissions in the 1998 agreement.  More generally the Northern Ireland case suggests 
that external intervention was essential at various points in the process to make progress.  
That external intervention was however almost always from outside the EU, and 
probably needed to be.55  
 
Responses 
The role of military force in Indian security responses clearly places India closer to the 
Bush administration, than the EU.  With a large military, a nuclear arsenal and record of 
                                                 
52 Rajendra K Jain, ‘The European Union and Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, in Shazia Aziz Wülbers 
(ed), EU India relations: a critique, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2008, pp. 77-96. 
53 Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 December 2010. 
54  Hasan-Askari Rizvi “ SAARC: Problems of Regional Cooperation”, South Asian Studies [Lahore] vol. 23, 
pp. 125-141. 
55 See Doyle, “Re-examining the Northern Ireland conflict”,  pp. 132-46. 
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deployment of very large numbers of troops – over 600,000 in Kashmir for example, 
armed force plays a leading role in security responses.  Indian defence expenditure was 
US$41b in 2010 – a fraction of the expenditure by EU member states, but a greater 
proportion of GDP at 2.7%, compared to about 1.7% for the EU 27.56  The Military, 
paramilitary police units and armed local militas have also been used extensively against 
armed Maoist / Naxalite groups. 
 
It would be wrong however to characterise India’s total response to insecurity as a 
military one.  As the above discussion on links to underlying causes shows there are 
significant social and economic programmes aimed at winning ‘hearts and minds’  and 
occasionally  at dealing with underlying problems, with all the limitations of their 
approach discussed above.  The Indian state has also been very active in seeking to open 
negotiations with armed groups, in Nagaland and Assam, for example.  The India state 
has called for discussions with Kashmiri militants and has appointed interlocutors.57  
However such talks have not progressed as Kashmiri militants seek tri-party talks 
including Pakistan and India rejects that approach, on the grounds that it will not discuss 
internal affairs with Pakistan, while of course having a separate  ‘composite dialogue’ 
with Pakistan on a range of issues including Jammu and Kashmir.  The Indian state 
shows a strong military resolve, has used inappropriate levels of force on many occasions 
and has serious questions to address on human rights issues, however taken as a whole 
Indian public discourse on internal security matters sees more important roles for 
economic interventions and negotiations, than is suggested by the 2002 US document 
even if it has fallen down on the delivery and implementation of both.   
 
On a global level the differences in approach between India and the USA are even 
stronger.  Notwithstanding a major effort to build a close relationship with the US after 
9-11 the Indian parliament unanimously ‘deplored’ the US invasion of Iraq.58  The then 
opposition Congress wanted an even stronger wording.  India remains a strong supporter 
of the UN, even if this is partly driven by a desire for non-interference in states’ internal 
affairs, this is balanced by a major commitment of troops to peacekeeping. 
 
                                                 
56 http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010 , accessed on 26 September 2011. 
57 See press release 13 October 2010, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/AdvSearch.aspx, accessed on 27 
September 2011.  
58 The Times of India, 9 April 2003. 
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Conclusion 
Indian approaches to security and conflict, contextualised by the well known US and EU 
security strategies offer a more nuanced view of security strategy than that which is 
commonly ascribed to India.  The comparisons are not direct.  While the US has suffered 
serious attacks conducted by its own citizens such as the Oklahoma bombing and 
individual attacks such as that in Fort Hood in 2009, it has not faced a sustained and 
organised armed campaign for political change.  The focus on external threats and 
international security is therefore understandable.  Likewise the EU as an institution has 
little competency and little experience dealing with the major armed conflicts within its 
member states – in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country in recent years and the 
Red Army Faction and Red Brigades in previous decades.  The EU security strategy is 
therefore primarily driven by its external roles, while acknowledging the internal factors.  
India is simultaneously dealing with both sets of security challenges. 
 
India security strategy reflects the simultaneous internal-external focus to a far greater 
extent that the US or the EU.  It is both dealing with sustained armed conflicts within its 
borders and a volatile region with difficult relationships between neighbouring states.  
India also deals with far greater internal political and social diversity than the USA.  Its 
internal diversity has been compared to that facing the EU in scale and complexity, but 
of course as a single state India has ultimate responsibility for the entire range of security 
strategies which are divided between state, the EU and NATO in Europe. 
 
India’s view of external security is more nuanced than often assumed.  It aspires to have 
influence as a large state and is very wary of according the international system any 
authority to intervene in internal security matters.  Nonetheless the Nehruvian tradition 
of non-alignment and support for the UN retains some power.  A pragmatic approach 
has seen much improved relations with the USA in the face of a strong domestic 
discourse opposing US foreign policy.   
 
The comparison of India with the US and Europe brings some clarity.  India retains 
some of the external focus on threats associated with the Bush administration in the 
USA, but its public discourse reflects a much greater priority given to understanding the 
underlying causes of conflict rather than simply seeing it as an evil to be defeated.  Of 
course in identifying those causes there are differences within Indian discourse on issues 
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such as inequality and human rights but those differences also exist in Europe.  India’s 
responses have been heavy handed at times and counter-productive but they do not, 
even internally, have the exclusive military focus of the 2002 US strategy.   
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